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REVIVING FAIR USE:
WHY SONY’S EXPANSION OF FAIR USE SPARKED
THE FILE-SHARING CRAZE
Christopher Alan Hower*
Introduction
In 1492, everyone believed the world was flat. In 1984, the Supreme Court tried to
convince us that time-shifting is fair use.1 Prior to this ruling, copyright holders enjoyed the right
to control access to their work under a statutory monopoly.2 The Supreme Court upset this state
of affairs by granting an unprecedented extension of power to consumers to infringe copyrighted
works.3 Justice Stevens characterized this ruling as a backlash against industry’s desire to
“control the way [consumers watch] television,” when in actuality it was the Court controlling
the way artists could provide access to their works.4
In effect, videotape recording of television programming deprived copyright owners of
the right to market convenience for their content, and instead granted the benefit solely to
technology producers.5 Videotape recording not only disproportionately advantaged technology
producers at the expense of artists,6 but also led consumers to feel entitled to an unwarranted
level of control over access to copyrighted works.7 With the ability to decide on what terms they
would watch television programming, it is no surprise that many viewers and listeners felt
justified participating in unauthorized file-sharing.8 Record labels and publishers could not react
fast enough to a new market for online sales, similar to how movie studios could not react fast
enough to the technological development of the home videotape recorder market. Consequently,
consumers decided to exploit the “right” to infringe copyrighted works granted by the Court,
resulting in substantial harm to artists.
This comment first discusses the development of the fair use affirmative defense and how
courts attempted to apply the defense to emerging technologies. Next, this comment proposes a
* J.D. Candidate 2007, George Washington University Law School; B.S., University of Florida. Christopher Hower
is a registered patent agent. He would like to thank his former copyright law and current intellectual property
seminar professor, Professor Ralph Oman, for providing guidance and perspective of copyright law, as well as its
policy implications and the legislative process.
1
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (hereinafter “Sony III”).
2
Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.917, 944 (Summer 2005) (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at
457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
3
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417.
4
Litman, supra note 2, at 932 (citing 1st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony III (No. 81-1687) (circulated
June 13, 1983) at 22).
5
Id. at 944 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
6
Maribel Rose Hilo, Tivo and the Incentive/Dissemination Conflict: The Economics of Extending Betamax to
Personal Video Recorders, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 1043, 1056 (Winter 2003) (citing Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1630-31 (1982)).
7
Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (citing Sony III at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
8
Id.
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legislative remedy for the current misapplication of fair use. Finally, this comment concludes
with the justification and effects of such legislation.
I. Background
A. Sony: Stealing Control for the First Time
1. The District Court
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America, content owners Universal
City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions, Inc. sued Sony Corporation and its distributor
Sony Corporation of America for direct and indirect copyright infringement caused by allowing
consumers to infringe copyright owners’ reproduction right with the Betamax device.9 Sony
alleged that home recording was not infringement and that even if it was that no theory of
infringement or vicarious liability could hold Sony responsible.10 Additionally, Sony argued that
its videotape recorders were a staple article of commerce, rendering Sony exempt from
contributory liability under the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law.11
Videotape recorders, such as the Betamax machines, introduced consumers to a level of
control over television content never before imagined by allowing a user to record a television
broadcast off-the-air.12 Prior to this innovation, broadcasters dictated when and what television
programs viewers could watch, but the Betamax enabled viewers to create a copy of a broadcast
television program on tape cassettes.13 Furthermore, the Betamax allowed users to skip
commercials using the pause and fast forward functions.14 Sony also invited the public to “record
favorite shows” or “build a library” without warning that creating copies of copyrighted works
may be copyright infringement.15
Universal and Disney proffered evidence documenting several accounts of consumers’
copying activity such as time-shifting16 and creating libraries of their favorite shows.17 Survey
evidence indicated that a substantial amount of consumers owned a large number of videotape
9

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (hereinafter “Sony I”), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Sony III).
10
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 433.
11
Id. at 459–461 (describing how the contribution made by a staple article of commerce towards infringement is
insufficient to establish contributory liability without impermissibly expanding infringement beyond precedent and
judicial management).
12
Id. at 435 (describing how consumers could record off-the-air broadcasts manually, or set timers to record for
remote recording).
13
Id. (noting that tapes are not universally compatible with videotape recorders, and that at the time of litigation the
highest-capacity tapes cost twenty one dollars each and record three hours of video).
14
Id. at 435–36 (clarifying that pause allows a user to omit commercials if the user is present throughout the
recording, and that a user can skip commercial segments by fast forwarding during playback).
15
Id. at 436 (stipulating that Sony reimbursed merchandise to an individual franchise dealer for creating
advertisements using “record your favorite show” and “build a library” language).
16
Id. at 465 (defining time-shifting as “[r]ecording off-the-air while not viewing the program, watching the copy
within a short period of time and erasing it thereafter”; recording a program while watching it is considered
infringing activity).
17
Id. at 436–38 (confirming that users created copies of copyrighted television programs and movies owned by
Universal and Disney).
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cassettes, did not engage exclusively in time-shifting, and engaged in activities to avoid
commercial advertisements.18 Despite the survey evidence, Universal and Disney were not able
to establish measurable economic loss at the time of trial, though they did present expert
testimony alleging prospective harm to the value of their copyrights.19
The District Court examined the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners20 and
determined that Congress did not intend to protect copyright holders’ right of reproduction with
respect to videotape recorders because of enforcement problems discussed in the legislative
history.21 Next, the District Court outlined the four factors of the fair use balancing test: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.22 Walking
through the analysis, the court concluded that time-shifting is fair use because it is a
noncommercial use of copyrighted material and has no effect on the market for such material.23
Next, the court held that Sony lacked sufficient knowledge of the infringing activity to be
contributorily liable, even though Sony knew “that the main use of the Betamax would be to
record copyrighted works off-the-air and that such recording is a copyright infringement.”24
Instead, the court introduced the staple article of commerce defense from patent law to justify
that “commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as
contributory infringers whenever they ‘constructively’ knew that some purchasers on some
occasions would use their product for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first
impression, to be an infringement.”25 Similarly, the court declined to impose vicarious liability
upon Sony because it found that Sony had neither a direct financial interest in consumers’
infringing activities, nor the right and ability to supervise the infringing activities.26
2. The Ninth Circuit

18

Id. at 438–39 (finding that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s surveys revealed that the average consumer owned
31.73 videotape cassettes, 29.6% of viewers watched recorded programs more than once, 41.7% of owners regularly
eliminated commercials from the recordings, and between 26.4% and 43.9% of interviewees used fast forward to
skip commercials often).
19
Id. at 439–40 (predicting that the Betamax would diminish the public’s interest in watching reruns, decrease the
size of live television audiences, and result in fewer film rentals).
20
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (focusing on the exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords and to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work).
21
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 446 (analyzing the difficulty of managing privacy interests in monitoring home-use
recording, which the infringement rendered uncontrollable and therefore outside the scope of copyright legislation).
22
Id. at 338 (noting that the statute codifies the factors presented in Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345, 1352 (1973)); 17 U.S.C. § 107.
23
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 456 (rationalizing that the potential for future harm, the fact that studios broadcast the
works for free, recording occurs in private homes, and that consumers copy the work in its entirety for a private use
equates to a fair use).
24
Id. at 459 (citing deposition testimony by Sony executives).
25
Id. at 461.
26
Id. (believing that a jamming system is outside the scope of Sony’s ability to enforce, and that Sony profits from
the sale of tapes regardless of their subsequent use).
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On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that time-shifting constituted an
infringement27 and failed the fair use balancing test.28 The court focused on Congress’s broad
legislative language, reasoning that Congress intended to cover current and future technology
subject to specific exceptions that did not include time-shifting.29 The court specified that
exemption from liability extends only to “productive uses,” which involve a second author’s use
of a first author’s work.30 The court determined that fair use does not extend to “ordinary uses.”31
Walking through the fair use factors, the Ninth Circuit articulated that copying the entirety of an
entertaining work for convenience weighs against finding a fair use because it “tends to diminish
or prejudice the potential sale” of a work.32
As a result of the fair use analysis, the court held Sony liable as a contributory infringer.33
Wholly rejecting the “staple article of commerce” defense imported from patent law by the
District Court, the Ninth Circuit distinguished videotape recorders from cameras or
photocopying machines because videotape recorders primarily reproduce television
programming, nearly all of which is copyrighted.34 Confronting the difficulty of fashioning an
appropriate remedy, the court conceded that an injunction may result in great public injury and
that more appropriate relief may include damages or a continuing royalty.35
3. The Supreme Court
a. The Majority Opinion
Reciting the District Court’s factual findings in painstaking detail, in a five-to-four split
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, claiming that imposing liability upon Sony would
impermissibly expand the scope of copyright protection.36 According to the Court, the public
benefit from the dissemination of works justified construing copyright protection against the
copyright holder.37 Turning to secondary liability, the Court determined that Sony did not
27

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter “Sony II”)
(interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act to deny a fair use defense for off-the-air copying).
28
Id. at 971–72 (disallowing the fair use defense for unproductive uses, such as reproducing copyrighted material
“for its intrinsic use”).
29
Id. at 967 (acknowledging that language permitting libraries to make off-the-air videotape recordings of newscasts
for research purposes “is intended to preclude performance, copying, or sale, whether or not for profit, by the
recipient of a copy of a television broadcast taped off-the-air pursuant to this clause”).
30
Id. at 970 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: ‘Fair Use’ Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1005, 1011-12 (1980) (establishing that the traditional applications of fair use deal with productive uses)).
31
Id. (quoting Leon Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright at 24 (1978) (confirming that copying for an
ordinary use results in ordinary infringement)).
32
Id. at 972-74 (quoting 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.05[E][4][c] at 13-84 (1981)).
33
Id. at 975-76 (finding that Sony knew infringement existed because the Betamax functions mainly to create a copy
of copyrighted material, and that Sony materially contributed to the infringing conduct through sufficient
commercial engagement).
34
Id. at 975 (concluding that videotape recorders are not suitable for substantial noninfringing uses, regardless of
whether some copyright owners choose not to protect their rights).
35
Id. at 976 (favoring a reasonable royalty, and reprimanding Sony for “[expecting] a return on investment from
activities which violate the copyright laws”).
36
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984) (focusing on the benefit of an expanded audience for time-shifted programs
and the lack of present economic harm in justifying the reversal).
37
Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
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intentionally induce its customers to infringe copyrights.38 Additionally, the Court adopted the
“staple article” defense from patent law for contributory copyright infringement, which dictates
that a device need “merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses” in order to escape
liability.39 In the Court’s view, a copying device will not infringe copyrights if it is merely
“capable of substantial noninfringing use.”40 Refusing to define what constitutes “substantial
noninfringing uses,”41 the Court held that under this standard Sony is not liable as a contributory
infringer because the Betamax is capable of at least one noninfringing use.42
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first addressed authorized time-shifting.43
Focusing on the benefit conferred to copyright owners who permit time-shifting by expanding
their audience, the majority recognized that copyright owners who permit time-shifting create a
substantial market for noninfringing uses.44 Furthermore, it continued that even unauthorized
time-shifting did not infringe.45 Discarding a “productive use” restriction, the Court reasoned that
time-shifting is not done for a profit, and the purpose of time-shifting permits copying an entire
work because private home use is why stations broadcast the work.46 Moreover, the majority
held that Universal and Disney failed to prove that a likelihood of future harm exists, and
established the legal precedent that unauthorized time-shifting is a fair use.47
b. Justice Blackmun’s Dissenting Opinion
Contrariwise, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Ninth Circuit, concluding that timeshifting infringes copyrighted works, fails the fair use balancing test, and renders Sony liable for
infringement.48 Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority evaded its duty to the law in refusing
to confront the tough copyright issues presented in the case.49

38

Id. at 439 n.19 (ignoring the findings of the district court, which evidence that Betamax advertisements
encouraged library building, which is an infringing use regardless of the interpretation of time-shifting).
39
Id. at 443 (lowering the bar for equipment manufacturers, who must only demonstrate that their device be capable
of operation without infringing--a standard that is almost impossible to for a manufacturer to fail).
40
Id.
41
Id. (disregarding the district court’s factual findings demonstrating a significant number of infringing uses).
42
Id. at 456 (proffering that because some copyright holders do not object to time-shifting and because Universal
and Disney did not show a likelihood of harm to the potential market for their works, Sony is not a contributory
infringer).
43
Id. at 443 (emphasizing that Universal and Disney own fewer than ten percent of the market share for television
programming).
44
Id. at 447 n.28 (“they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic noninfringing use of Sony’s product”).
But see, Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not be
available to the copyright holder were it not for the infringer’s activities does not permit the infringer to exploit that
market without compensating the copyright holder” (citing Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (CA2 1980)).
45
Id. at 447 (applying the fair use doctrine to unauthorized time-shifting).
46
Id. at 449–50 (presuming fair use when the copyist does not profit).
47
Id. at 451 (shifting the burden of proof to the copyright owner to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that
future harm is likely when the use of a copyrighted work is noncommercial).
48
Id. at 457–500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49
Id. at 458 (identifying with the Ninth Circuit that finding fair use merely sidesteps the difficulty in fashioning a
remedy).
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After detailing his own version of the facts, Justice Blackmun determined that timeshifting constituted infringement of copyright works.50 With respect to motion pictures, he noted
that “mere duplication of a copy may constitute an infringement even if it is never viewed.”51
Proceeding to the fair use analysis, the dissenting Justices rejected applying the defense to
unproductive uses. Justice Blackmun reasoned that that no court ever found fair use when the
reproduction benefited only the user.52 Attacking the majority view that time-shifting is fair use
because television programs are broadcast for free over-the-air, Justice Blackmun employed a
powerful analogy: “Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is equally
irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library may not be copied any more freely than a
book that is purchased.”53 For a plaintiff to meet his burden of proof, the dissent would require
only proof of potential harm to the value of the work.54 According to the dissent, a market for
Betamax machines inherently constitutes proof of harm to the potential market for copyrighted
works.55
Having determined that time-shifting infringes a copyright owner’s works, Justice
Blackmun would have upheld the Ninth Circuit and found Sony liable for “induc[ing] and
materially contribut[ing] to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners.”56 The dissent reasoned
that Sony knew that infringement occurred because the intended use of the Betamax is off-the-air
recording, and it is not necessary to know that the infringing activity is a copyright violation; one
only needs to know that the infringing act takes place.57 In addition, Sony encouraged infringing
activity by advertising without warning of possible copyright infringement.58
The dissenting Justices saw no need to employ the staple article of commerce to
copyright law, which is based on patent law principles.59 However, in an effort to foster
commerce, Justice Blackmun proposed that “if a significant portion of the product’s use is
noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for the product’s
infringing uses.”60 He continued to say that in order to resolve the present issue, the entire market

50

Id. at 464–70 (rejecting that neither the statute nor its legislative history suggest “any intent to create a general
exemption for a single copy made for a personal or private use”).
51
Id. at 474 (quoting Register’s Supplementary Report 16).
52
Id. at 479 (citing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376
(1975)).
53
Id. at 480 (reiterating a copyright owners’ exclusive right to control reproduction of a work).
54
Id. at 482 (calculating that while little harm may currently result from an isolated use, on aggregate, these uses
may multiply to a great harm in the future).
55
Id. at 485 (advancing that the Betamax deprives copyright owners from charging a price for convenient access to
their works).
56
Id. at 489–90 (explaining that contributory liability in copyright depends neither on formal control over the
infringer nor actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement).
57
Id. at 489 (outlining a reduction in damages for unintentional infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), but no
general exemption from liability); see also Sony II, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981).
58
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 489–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
(finding that Sony advertised the Betamax by encouraging consumers to record “favorite shows,” and “classic
movies”)).
59
Id. at 490–91 (noting that patent law and copyright law evolved separately and distinctly from one another).
60
Id. at 491 (suggesting that where one would not buy a product for a use other than infringing activity, the
manufacturer cannot escape liability).
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must be considered, not merely the share of the plaintiff’s works.61 Thus, the availability of the
staple defense depends on the quantum of infringing use of a device in the entire market.62
Echoing the Ninth Circuit, the dissent posited that the majority refrained from finding liability to
escape the difficulty in fashioning an appropriate remedy.63 Discussing the four fair use factors
once more, the dissent first advanced that the consumptive use of time-shifting is hardly
noncommercial because the benefit accrues to the user rather than others.64 Next, Justice
Blackmun stated that the second and third factors negate finding fair use because television
programming is highly creative and copied in its entirety.65 Finally, he concluded that current
harm exists because the value in a copyright would increase for compensation due to timeshifting.66
B. Repercussions: Consumers Steal Control on Their Own
This section observes effects the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony III had on fair use and
emerging technologies. First, this section details the Ninth Circuit approach to the fair use
defense and how it declined to apply fair use to new internet technologies.67 Next, this section
observes how the Seventh Circuit imposed secondary liability on a defendant in the presence of
“substantial noninfringing uses” more favorable than those found in Sony.68 Finally, this section
revisits the fair use defense with the Supreme Court’s addition of intent as a factor to be
considered in the fair use defense analysis.69
1. Napster
a. The District Court
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., several record companies sued Napster, Inc., an
internet start-up company, for creating a program that enabled users to download music files
without payment to the music industry.70 The District Court declined to expand the “fair use”
doctrine from Sony III, and granted a preliminary injunction against Napster from engaging or

61

Id. at 492 n.44 (criticizing the majority for excusing Sony from liability because Universal and Disney do not own
a large amount of the television programming market).
62
Id. at 492 (stating that the amount of television programming that is copyrighted is irrelevant, and observing that
the district court declined to inquire what proportion of Betamax usage is illegal).
63
Id. at 493–94 (lambasting the majority’s justification that finding infringement would frustrate those copyright
owners who permit time-shifting).
64
Id. at 496 (analogizing this interpretation to a jewelry thief who wears the stolen goods rather than selling them).
65
Id. at 496–97 (indicating that fair use extends more to informational works, and permits copying only the amount
necessary to further an author’s own creative endeavor).
66
Id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (embracing the cost of convenience as the price time-shifting denies
copyright owners).
67
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (hereinafter “Napster I”), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter “Napster II”).
68
In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter “Aimster”), cert denied, Deep v.
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
69
See, generally, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (hereinafter
“Grokster”).
70
Napster I, 114 F.Supp.2d at 1004.
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assisting others in “copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted
music without the express permission of the rights owner.”71
Offering its file-sharing software free of charge, Napster provided search and browse
functions for locating music files without regard to the copyright status of the files.72 Napster
indexed lists of shared files on the user’s computer and transmitted this data to a master server,
which coordinated communication between users and facilitated their searches.73 The Napster
system worked as follows: Napster’s software allowed users to search for a file, Napster’s server
answered the search by providing a list of all other users with the desired music file, and the user
who requested the search then initiated a connection to download the music file from the selected
source.74
The plaintiffs planned or had already attempted to offer their own authorized digital
downloading.75 Digital music offered by the plaintiffs typically contained watermarks,
encryption, or other limitations that cause a download to expire after a certain time, whereas files
obtained through Napster had no restrictions.76 Napster’s unrestricted music distribution
allegedly harmed plaintiffs by decreasing album sales in college markets, thwarting plaintiffs’
own efforts to begin digital music sales, and disrupting plaintiffs’ promotional efforts in
releasing restricted downloads.77 Notably, the court pointed out testimony of one expert who
claimed that “[Napster] has contributed to a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs ought
to be free—an attitude that creates formidable hurdles for the establishment of a commercial
downloading market.”78
The court concluded that the commercially significant use of Napster’s file-sharing
program involved unauthorized transfers of copyrighted music without considering whether such
transfers constituted fair use, or whether the staple article of commerce doctrine exempted
Napster from liability.79 Going through the fair use balancing test, for the first factor the court
held that the nature of the use weighed against fair use because users got something for free that
they would ordinarily pay for, even if the users did not themselves sell the downloaded music.80
Next, the court found that both the inherent creativity of music and copying the entire song
weighed against finding fair use for the second and third factors concerning the nature and extent

71

Id. at 900–01.
Id. at 905 (acknowledging that the software permits users to share their own music files).
73
Id. at 905–06 (indicating that Napster maintains an ongoing interaction with its users, updating lists of each user’s
shared files when they log in and sign off).
74
Id. at 906 (qualifying that Napster does not store music files on its own server, but facilitates establishing
connections between users logged in to the system).
75
Id. at 908 (detailing entry into the online marketplace by BMG Music, EMI Recorded Music, North America,
Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Records, Warner Music Group and others).
76
Id. at 909 (emphasizing the need for restrictions to prevent copyright infringement).
77
Id. at 909–11 (reviewing survey evidence that indicated a decrease in sales near the most “wired” colleges).
78
Id. at 910–11 (indicating that consumers may feel entitled to a level of control over copyrights that has no lawful
precedent or other justification).
79
Id. at 912 (enunciating that the defendant must prove an affirmative defense such as fair use or the staple article of
commerce doctrine after having established that direct infringement exists).
80
Id. at 912 (announcing that at a minimum, sharing files cannot be considered a private use).
72
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of the use.81 Finally, the court addressed potential harm to the market for the copyrighted work
and decided against finding fair use because users obtained songs that they would otherwise have
to pay for.82 The court noted that even if record sales increased when a user downloaded a song
or eventually bought the album legitimately, positive impacts on the market do not mitigate
potential market harm or excuse infringement.83 Additionally, Napster could not claim protection
under the staple article of commerce doctrine because space-shifting84 did not constitute a
substantial enough use of Napster’s software, and because Napster provided a service that it
maintained control over.85
After finding that file downloading constituted direct infringement on behalf of third
party users, the court held that Napster was liable for such third party use both contributorily and
vicariously. The court reasoned that Napster had reason to know of users’ direct infringement
because of internal documents, RIAA notices of infringement, and exemplary screenshots that
displayed infringing files.86 Napster also contributed to the infringement because Napster
actively facilitated the infringement.87 Finally, the court held Napster vicariously liable because
Napster exercised control over its service and benefited financially from a large user base which
it could commercially exploit at a later date.88
b. The Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding Napster liable for
contributory and vicarious infringement.89 First, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the first fair use
factor weighed against Napster because users repeatedly exploited unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works to avoid paying for legitimate copies.90 Second, users copied creative works
in their entirety, tilting the second and third factors against finding fair use.91 Lastly, the Court
determined that Napster’s offering a service for free in competition with the plaintiff’s system of
pay-per download constituted, at the very least, a potential harm to the market for the plaintiff’s
copyright works.92 Furthermore, the court rejected Napster’s argument that sampling93 uses were
81

Id. at 913 (restating that even if the first factor finds a private use, the third factor may weigh against fair use if the
copying is likely to harm the potential market for the copyrighted works).
82
Id. at 913–14 (rejecting Napster’s comparisons of its file transfers to promotional downloads because Napster
downloads are permanent and unrestricted).
83
Id. at 914 (citing Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F.3d 70, 81 n.16 (2d Cir. 1997) (clarifying that
subsequent benefit to the copyright holder does not deny entitlement to licensing fees)).
84
Id. at 915–16 (defining space-shifting as downloading music files of songs when the user already owns the
accompanying album).
85
Id. at 916–17 (distinguishing Sony III, where Sony could not control the Betamax device after a sale).
86
Id. at 918–19 (articulating that the law does not require knowledge of specific acts of infringement).
87
Id. at 920 (analogizing Napster to the swap meet vendors in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1976) (finding contributory liability for swap meet operators who permitted vendors to sell counterfeit
music recordings)).
88
Id. at 920-21 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.3d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971)
(reiterating that a defendant need only be capable of supervising, and that a defendant need not actually supervise)).
89
Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
90
Id. at 1015 (indicating that “direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use”).
91
Id. at 1016 (distinguishing Sony III as having circumstances for allowing fair use copying of a creative work in its
entirety not present here).
92
Id. at 1017 (reasoning that consumers would not pay for what they may obtain for free).
93
Id. at 1018 (defining sampling as downloading a track on an evaluation basis before purchasing an album).
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noncommercial and fair because copyright owners commercialized internet song samples and
enjoyed the right to license their content regardless of any benefit conferred by Napster.94
Similarly, the court did not agree that space-shifting is a fair use because users who may not own
a legitimate copy may access all files.95
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed contributory infringement and agreed with the lower
court that Napster had actual and constructive knowledge of,96 and materially contributed to, its
users’ infringement.97 Moreover, the court held Napster vicariously liable because Napster
declined to block or remove unauthorized material because it stood to financially benefit through
advertising as more users subscribed for access to infringing material.98 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction, disfavoring compulsory royalties as a remedy.99
Royalties alone would deny copyright owners their right to not license their works, in addition to
their right to negotiate the terms of an agreement.100
2. Disregarding Substantial Non-Infringing Uses in Aimster
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation involved copyright owners suing another file-sharing
program called “Aimster.”101 Aimster worked in conjunction with instant-messaging applications
and allowed users to share files.102 Someone running Aimster would specify what files they
wished to share, searched for a file that another Aimster user had, and initiated an encrypted
transfer of the file.103
Judge Posner concluded that Aimster contributorily infringed plaintiff’s copyrights,
focusing on evidence that Aimster encouraged infringement, instead of focusing on Aimster’s
failure to limit infringement.104 He explained that willful blindness constitutes knowledge in
copyright law.105 The court found that encrypting all user transfers weighed against Aimster
because Aimster proffered no evidence that monitoring its service would be disproportionately
costly compared to reduced piracy rates, regardless of whether Aimster had substantial
noninfringing uses.106 Judge Posner rebuffed Aimster’s argument that plaintiffs failed to prove
94

Id. (recognizing that internet sites obtained licenses to offer song samples).
Id. (reconciling the space-shifting use in Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), because in that case space-shifting occurred on a private device).
96
Id. at 1020 (asserting that a computer system operator who knows of infringing activity and fails to remove it
“knows of and contributes to direct infringement”).
97
Id. (reasoning that without Napster’s service, there would not be any infringement, so Napster must necessarily
contribute to the infringement).
98
Id. at 1024 (tweaking the district court’s ruling because Napster could not police the content of files, but it could
monitor file names, which must retain accuracy to search effectively).
99
Id. at 1029 (refusing to allow Napster to avoid future injunctions, statutory damages, and criminal penalties for
future violations).
100
Id.
101
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
102
Id. at 646 (articulating that a user may share with other users on his “buddy list,” or if no buddies are specified,
all other Aimster users).
103
Id. (acknowledging that Aimster cannot monitor what files users transfer because it encrypts all transmissions).
104
Id. at 653 (fixating on a tutorial example that displayed only infringing material).
105
Id. at 650 (citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987)).
106
Id. at 653 (continuing that Aimster did not show how hiding the data users transfer from itself helped or saved
costs).
95
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damages because copyright law does not require established harm; instead, it allows plaintiffs to
seek statutory damages or an injunction.107 Lastly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s judgment of vicarious infringement because of Aimster’s “ostrich-like refusal to
discover the extent to which its system was being used to infringe copyright.”108
3. Indirect Liability Gains Intent in Grokster
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held
Grokster, Ltd., (“Grokster”) liable for promoting copyright infringement to distribute a device
capable of infringement.109 Grokster completely decentralized their software, negating the need
for intermediary servers to coordinate searches like its predecessor, Napster.110 Plaintiff MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., (“MGM”) commissioned a study concluding that copyrighted
works constituted almost 90% of Grokster’s content.111 Additionally, through internal documents
and advertising, Grokster heavily leveraged itself as the ultimate beneficiary of the Napster
shutdown.112
Discussing whether to hold Grokster indirectly liable, the Court discussed the tension
between technological innovation and artistic protection.113 Overruling the lower court’s
interpretation of Sony III, the Supreme Court clarified its precedent to limit intent inferred from
the characteristics or uses of product but not direct evidence from the distributor.114
Consequently, the Court reiterated the rule for inducement of infringement as “active steps . . .
taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising, instructing, or encouraging
infringing uses.115 Three factors motivated the Justices to find indirect liability: (1) Grokster
attempted to fill Napster’s void for copyright infringement; (2) Grokster failed to take any
technological steps to limit infringement; and (3) Grokster profited more for each user recruited
because of the popularity of infringement.116
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence comparing the statistics of infringement in Grokster
to those from the Betamax, and concluded that both had similar levels of noninfringing activity
107

Id. at 649 (distinguishing the Justices’ reasoning in Sony III because in that case, Universal could not establish
harm and benefited from a new market).
108
Id. at 655 (contrasting Sony III, where the Court treated vicarious and contributory liability the same, and
declined to recognize that Sony could have reduced the likelihood of infringement).
109
545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
110
Id. at 922 (conceding that Grokster has no knowledge of what or when users copied files because each user’s
computer communicates directly with other users’ computers).
111
Id. at 923 (comparing this result to the 87% of infringing material found in Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)).
112
Id. at 924–26 (elaborating how Grokster: intended to “leverage Napster’s 50 million user base;” planned to place
an ad encouraging users to “get around” a re-launched, legal, fee-based Napster; sought to provoke an infringement
lawsuit for publicity; strove to provide a large number of copyrighted songs; and sent newsletters extolling its ability
to provide copyrighted works).
113
Id. at 928–29 (considering that it may be impossible for plaintiffs to seek relief realistically, except against
software distributors).
114
Id. at 934 (rejecting the lower court’s ruling that Grokster is not liable because the software has substantial
noninfringing uses).
115
Id. at 936 (quoting Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
116
Id. at 939–40 (establishing induced infringement from these indicia for intent with the evidence of direct
infringement).
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at 10% and 9%, respectively.117 He listed the noninfringing uses for Grokster and questioned
whether to modify the Sony III rule to account for further development of such noninfringing
activity.118 Declining to modify Sony III, he concluded that it would be premature to modify the
rule, and that Congress is capable of weighing in if necessary.119
II. Proposed Legislative Solution
This legislation clarifies the guidelines for applying the fair use defense to better aid
courts in determining when this defense should be available.120 Clear boundaries for what
constitutes fair use will allow technological innovators to design their products accordingly and
eliminate the uncertainty of potential infringement suits.121 However, the boundaries must strike
a fair balance meaning that “the interests of authors must yield to the public welfare where they
conflict.”122
A. Legislative Text
A BILL
To amend chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, relating to fair use as a limitation on
exclusive rights, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Artists’ Rights and Technology Act of 2008.”
SEC. 2. FAIR USE.
Section 107 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting “productive” before
“purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”
B. Legislative Intent
Here, the public interests served by the fair use exception find their roots in a quote by
Justice Story, who first described fair use as
a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other;
the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work;
117

Id. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) (inferring approximately the same amount of lawful use as found in Sony III).
Id. at 954–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asking whether the Sony III rule succeeded in protecting new technology
while preserving copyright protection).
119
Id. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing other solutions to the technology/copyright tension such as suing
direct infringers, developing anti-copying measures, and facilitating lawful downloading).
120
See Blake Evan Reese, Fixing Through Legislative Fixation: A Call for the Codification and Modernization of
the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine as It Applies to Copyright Law, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 443
(Summer 2007) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–66
(1992)).
121
Id. (suggesting that clear boundaries afford greater freedom and fairness to decision-makers, immunizing them
from arbitrary judgments).
122
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6 (1961) (considering the legislative intent
for copyright as an economic incentive to encourage creation in order to ultimately serve the public).
118
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and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to
the same common sources of information.”123
Adding his own judicial gloss, Justice Story continued to distill precedent into the four
factors adopted almost verbatim by Congress: “the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”124 With those guiding
principles, the proposed Artists’ Rights and Technology Act of 2008 (ART Act) preserves the
fair use doctrine to encourage authorship while establishing clear guideposts for future
innovators.
Justice Fortas spoke with great wisdom when he cautioned the Court to “do as little
damage as possible to traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties face.”125
Twenty-three years ago, the Supreme Court would have better served the law by heeding this
warning. Instead, it failed to follow its own advice to defer to Congress in the face of
technological advancements and shifting markets.126 “[There] can be no really satisfactory
solution to the problem presented here, until Congress acts.”127 Even the District Court in Sony I
recognized that it had no place divining the effects that videotape recorders would have on
copyrighted television and movie programming because courts are not suited for such economic
predictions.128 Consequently, when the Supreme Court expanded fair use to include timeshifting, it upset the delicate balance between technological innovation and artists’ rights.129
Never before had the public been given so much freedom to trample the exclusive rights
protected by copyright.130
1. Productive Uses Embrace the Notion of Fair Use

uses.

131

Case law suggests that until Sony III, courts reserved fair use solely for productive
This legislation codifies that distinction because Congressional studies rejected

123

Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851 (Summer 2006) (quoting
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
124
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
125
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 404 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
126
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyright materials. Congress has the
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”; “defining the contours of copyright law is a job for
Congress”).
127
Id. at 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 167
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
128
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (recognizing the magnitude of the implications for this new
technology and deferring to “government commission or legislative body” to evaluate the repercussions).
129
Id.
130
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910–11 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
131
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing copying for the advancement of
scientific research, private study or scholarship with purely personal use).
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exempting private, unproductive uses.132 Copyright law must permit productive fair use because
it fosters authorship by allowing borrowers to take the material necessary to complete their
works, whereas protecting private uses becomes “a fair use subsidy at the author’s expense.”133
On the other hand, unproductive, ordinary uses involve no authorship and contribute no
greater good to society.134 The Supreme Court agreed, recognizing the important distinction
between productive and ordinary uses.135 Indeed, an unproductive use such as time-shifting
merely displaces the demand for the original work because an ordinary use consumes the work
without adding any further value, and courts explicitly exempt from fair use those uses that
displace demand for the original work.136
To avoid this pitfall, Justice Blackmun suggested that ordinary uses may qualify for fair
use after showing that no potential harm exists to the value of the owner’s work.137 However, it
is far too difficult to prove an absence of harm to potential markets, so practical reasons alone
favor legislatively closing this hole.138 In addition, it may be difficult or impossible to determine
what harm exists at the time of suit, and waiting will only further damage the copyright owner’s
position in the market.139
For example, suppose a study commissioned today found that over-the-air time-shifting,
as considered by the Court in Sony III,140 substantially diminished the demand for streaming
web-casts of the same program. Content owners would rightly expect to capitalize on advertising
inserted into a web-cast, similar to how commercial interruptions subsidize an original over-theair broadcast.141 However, time-shifting deprives the copyright owner the advertising revenue he
is entitled to for offering a convenient web-cast service because the time-shifting displaces the
demand for an on-demand web-cast.142 Thus, harm exists even in the vacuum of the Sony III
majority’s idealized definition of time-shifting where no one fast-forwards, watches a program a
second time, or records while watching the original broadcast—hardly a practical presumption
132

Id. at 465–66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing A. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted in
STUDY NO. 14 FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED FOR
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1 (1960)).
133
Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding that home recording is an ordinary use).
134
Id. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (comparing the benefits of criticism, education and research with a purely
consumptive use for entertainment value).
135
Litman, supra note 2, at 950 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
136
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (allowing a hypothetical review to cite excerpts from a work, but
not allowing a review to quote the most important parts of a work in order to substitute the review for the original)).
137
Litman, supra note 2, at 950 (citing 1st Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687 (circulated by Justice Blackmun,
June 13, 1983) at 62).
138
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 497–99 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the difficulty in finding potential
market harm when new technology creates a new market for old copyrighted works).
139
Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that
videotape recording denies copyright owners the ability to exploit the price a viewer will pay for convenience)).
140
Id. at 923 (citing James Lardner, Fast Forward 60–81 at 97–106 (2002) (announcing that stores across America
sold out of blank videotapes when studios broadcast Gone with the Wind, and Disney feared copying and declined to
broadcast movies); see also Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436–40 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
141
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 446 n.28 (explaining that copyright owners capitalize upon television by subsidizing
broadcasts with advertising).
142
Id.
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for a realistic potential market harm analysis.143 Consequently, this legislation closes the
loophole for unproductive fair uses in order to allow artists to maximize the benefit deserved for
their work.144
2. Applying the Fair Use Factors under the New Statutory Scheme
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor embraces the notion that only productive uses should warrant
protection. In Sony III, the Supreme Court suggested that commercial uses presumptively
weighed against a finding of fair use,145 but the Court abandoned this presumption in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music.146 However, the Court did not abandon its presumption of harm from
commercial exploitation; it merely clarified that it will presume harm only for unproductive
commercial copying.147
The ART Act codifies the distinction between productive and ordinary uses to guide
courts when balancing the first fair use factor. The term “commercial” suggests an economic
exchange without specifying whether that entails seeking a profit, denying the copyright owner
royalties, or exacting a toll from the public.148 Under this Act, “commercial use” embodies
transactions where an infringing copy is made without returning value to society.149 A second
artist justifies his commercial gain in taking from an existing work by creating a new work.150
His contribution of a new work tends to negate any unjust enrichment and renders this use
noncommercial.151 Copyright law encourages artists to create by rewarding them
economically,152 but occasionally the public desire for further creation mandates that an artist

143

Id. at 922 (citing Macy’s Sony Betamax display ad, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1976, at 13 (encouraging users to
build “a priceless videotape library in no time”)).
144
Id. at 927 (citing HOME RECORDING OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS: HEARINGS ON H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808,
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, AND H.R. 5705 BEFORE THE SUBCOM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG. 1-3 at 4-16, 67-115 (1982)
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. and memorandum of Prof.
Laurence H. Tribe) (“any law that exempted home videotaping from liability for copyright infringement would be an
unconstitutional taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”)).
145
464 U.S. at 451 (presuming likely future harm when copying is for a commercial purpose); cf., Litman, supra
note 2, at 949 (clarifying that noncommercial uses require proof of present or potential harm but commercial uses do
not).
146
510 U.S. 569, 584–91 (1994) (refuting that Sony III established a presumption of harm for commercial uses);
Litman, supra note 2, at 949; Durham, supra note 123, at 868.
147
Durham, supra note 123, at 868 (maintaining the presumption of likely future harm for “outright duplication for
commercial uses, as opposed to more complex situations like parody”).
148
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007).
149
Durham, supra note 123, at 883 (likening copying for personal benefit to stealing).
150
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (encouraging the promotion of science).
151
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's expense--to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author's work for the
public good.” (citations omitted)).
152
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, In Search of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11,
15 (2005) (contrasting the economic motivation that guided the drafters of the Constitution with the inalienable
personal right to a work embraced by Europe).
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forego his usual fee.153 Value created by the new work outweighs the loss to the original artist,
which justifies the infringing copy.154
Commercial use cannot refer to whether the second work is for a profit—copyright law
understands that every work is for a profit because every fixed work gets copyright protection to
encourage its creation.155 Thus, the second work is always broadly “commercial” because it
receives copyright protection automatically.156 Adding the word “productive” focuses the
meaning of “commercial” to those uses that do not return value to society in exchange for their
unauthorized copying, which better allows courts to make consistent decisions when applying
the fair use defense.
Consequently, the time-shifting present in Sony III constituted a commercial use despite
taking place in private homes.157 Copying with a Betamax device does not give back to the
public; no redeeming quality justifies fair use for such copying because a Betamax contributes no
value to society as a whole.158 Instead of consulting a moving target like “substantial
noninfringing uses,” exempting only productive noncommercial uses under this definition solves
the line-drawing problem the Supreme Court had in Sony III.159 The Court’s mistake stole from
copyright owners the right to value convenient access to their works, which instilled a sense of
entitlement in the public to justify taking for convenience.160
Unfortunately, this new attitude led consumers to take music when file-sharing offered it
more conveniently than record labels and publishers. Similar to how many Betamax users
infringed works under the Sony III majority’s erroneous fair use standard, 161 file-sharers infringe
copyrighted works by downloading and keeping instead of “time-shifting” songs broadcast on
the radio for free.162 The Supreme Court gave consumers an unjustified inch, and in return
consumers have taken a mile. Ed. Note: while grammatically correct, this language is a bit
clichéd.
b. Nature of the Work and Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

153

Sony III, 464 U.S. at 478.
Id. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 511 (1945) ("The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.'")).
155
Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 152.
156
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression”).
157
Durham, supra note 123, at 880 (classifying home taping as copying).
158
Litman, supra note 2, at 928 (explaining that the Betamax creates a more convenient copy for personal use with
no compensation for the work’s owner).
159
A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 47, 78 (1989) (speculating that the majority would have been different if more evidence showed more
“librarying” Betamax usage).
160
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (describing how the Betamax granted additional control over
programming to consumers).
161
Reese, supra note 120, at 467 (noting that at least 25 percent of Betamax users fast-forwarded through
commercials).
162
Litman, supra note 2, at 953 (detailing that most consumers build music libraries rather than time-shift).
154

7 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 90

Copyright © 2008, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
With no discernable effect on the second and third fair use factors, the ART Act leaves
little to discuss here. Even the overly-broad application of fair use by the Sony III majority
struggled to conclude that copying a creative work in its entirety does not weigh against fair
use.163 Productive uses justify copying only to the extent necessary to create the new work,164 so
these provisions continue to protect creative works independent of any new technology.
c. Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market or Value of the Work
The ART Act eliminates unproductive uses from claiming fair use because unproductive
uses harm the potential market or value of a work.165 Allowing harmful, unproductive uses to
qualify fair use may discourage artists from creating.166 Ordinary uses may seem innocuous at
first, but when considered in aggregate they can prove quite harmful.167
Also, because fair use excuses an infringer from compensating the original artist, fair use
presumes that the defendant harms the copyright holder.168 This presumption protects artists who
cannot demonstrate harm when brand-new technologies facilitate copying.169 Assessing the
effects copying technology will have on works takes time,170 but often such a delay may
decimate a legitimate market, particularly when the market is newly formed as a result of
technological advances.171
Again, once technology enables viewers to watch programs whenever they desire, the
market for such convenience diminishes greatly because the public is no longer motivated to pay
for access when they can merely copy a program on its own.172 Maintaining that copying for
163

Oddi, supra note 159, at 62 (denigrating the majority view that offering a work at some point for free affects how
much may be copied).
164
Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 496–97 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (permitting copying small excerpts to facilitate
further authorship).
165
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (citing 3 Nimmer § 13.05[B], at
13–77 – 13–78 (prohibiting fair use when any rights in a copyrighted work are adversely affected)).
166
Id. at 566 (recognizing the fourth factor as the most important in the fair use analysis); New Era Publication v.
Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
167
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 451 (maintaining that widespread use resulting
in harm negates fair use)).
168
Oddi, supra note 159, at 63 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 485); Litman, supra note 2, at 949–50 (citing Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (placing the burden of proof on defendant)). But see, Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 567 (requiring the copyright owner to establish a loss in revenue to shift the burden to the
infringer); Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs for noncommercial uses).
169
Durham, supra note 123, at 884 (observing that the studios in Sony III could not initially demonstrate harm from
time-shifting).
170
Hilo, supra note 6, at 1056 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for not considering the future market, and myopically focusing on the current effect of time-shifting)).
171
Seth A. Miller, Peer-to-Peer File Distribution: An Analysis of Design, Liability, Litigation, and Potential
Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 186–87 (Winter 2006) (citing Benny Evangelista, RIAA Smells Victory, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 22, 2003, at B1; Anna E. Engelman & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 3 (2004)) (attributing a decline of $2.4 billion in revenue to the music industry and $3 billion to the film
industry from illegal downloading).
172
Litman, supra note 2, at 941 (providing that time-shifting competes with the market for pre-recorded cassettes);
Hilo, supra note 6, at 1064 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1630-31 (1982) (implying that
authors will have less incentive to create when viewers command greater control over access to works)).
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unproductive personal use is not fair use opens up a new market for revenue where the copyright
owner can exploit the demand for the ability to create convenient copies.173 However, allowing
ordinary copying under fair use accrues benefit to the technology rather than the content creator
and discourages creation.174 Moreover, technology that allows unproductive copying may bypass
advertisements,175 which could decrease advertising revenues.176 Thus, this legislation eliminates
unproductive copying from fair use because such activity disproportionately harms copyright
owners with no resulting benefit to society.
3. Effects of This Legislation on Indirect Liability
Allowing only productive fair uses will affect technology developers by imposing
liability upon parties who were in the clear before. However, this legislation provides predictable
results for companies to plan accordingly.177 Many ordinary uses are personal because the
motivation is for self-gain by consuming a work. For this reason, going after direct infringers is
overly burdensome178 and copyright holders should be able to protect their investments by
pursuing those who facilitate or encourage infringement.179
Infringement liability by inducement remains unaffected because any party encouraging
infringement should be held liable for their acts, though more parties may be found liable given
the productive definition of fair use.180 New technologies enable consumers to infringe easier
today than in the past, which may weaken copyright protection.181 Any party who promotes
infringement and compounds the harm created by advancements in copying technology will be
held indirectly liable of inducing infringement.182
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Hilo, supra note 6, at 1056 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 498 (observing that Sony benefits from the sale of
Betamax devices and tapes, not the studios)).
175
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Similarly, this legislation does not modify existing contributory liability law or the staple
article of commerce doctrine, but the modified definition of fair use may result in greater
liability, because if a device is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses, courts will hold the
manufacturer liable.183 To mitigate or even escape liability, manufacturers can implement
technological measures to dissuade their customers from infringing copyrighted material.184
There is no affirmative duty to take such preventative action,185 but such effort allows
manufacturers to retain control over the use of their product lest consumers make use of it
against the manufacturer’s intentions.186
4. Re-Evaluating Remedies for Productive Fair Use
Eliminating the fair use defense for ordinary uses such as time-shifting will result in more
instances of infringement. With the influx of additional infringers, traditional remedies will not
adequately satisfy the parties involved.187 Every act of infringement warrants minimum statutory
damages, but these damages may be unreasonably high; new remedy schemes such as limited
injunctions or compulsory licenses are necessary to encourage technological growth.188
First, limited injunctions may provide that manufacturers found indirectly liable for
infringement must utilize anti-infringement measures,189 or modify the culpable device in such a
way that impedes infringing activity.190 However, in some circumstances anti-infringement
mechanisms could present a market disadvantage and make this remedy unsuitable.191
When limited injunctions provide unsatisfactory results, compulsory licensing schemes
offer new solutions.192 Compulsory licensing is particularly attractive when “technology has
created new uses for which the author’s exclusive rights have not been clearly established . . .
[or] when technology has made old licensing methods for established rights ponderous or
183
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184
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inefficient.”193 Indeed, this approach proved successful in many foreign members of the Berne
Convention, and should likewise do well in the United States.194
Conclusion
Expanding the fair use defense beyond its intended confines over-extended consumer
control of access to copyrighted works.195 This additional control trampled on artists’ rights to
lawfully exploit their works, and encouraged consumers to take like never before.196 Before
artists lose the incentive to create, Congress should address the current consumer climate of
indifference and the resulting rampant infringement. Currently, content providers stand to lose
substantial revenue to technologies that enable widespread infringement of perfect copies with
unparalleled ease.197 After the Supreme Court granted consumers the “right” to control access to
copyrighted works, consumers naturally grew to expect similar unrestrained access to all media.
Congress should adopt the ART Act to restore fair use to its role protecting and encouraging
authorship and put an end to harmful “convenience theft.”
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